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ABSTRACT 
 
The key aim of this paper is to test the relevance of the different financing theories for explaining 
capital structure choice in the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) sector in Mauritius. One of 
the areas of financial theory that has worried much of academicians and professionals is debt 
policy decisions in firms due to the limited study in this field. Three of the most relevant theories of 
capital structure are explored, namely the Trade Off Theory, the Agency Theory and the Pecking 
Order Theory (POH). Hence, in order to shed more light over this issue, an empirical analysis has 
been carried out over a panel data sample of 25 firms of SMEs for the period 2002-2008, using 
quantitative analysis. The panel data methodology is used to test empirical hypotheses and 
controls for firm heteroskecedasticity and corrects for autocorrelation among the variables that 
are involved. The findings show that some theories are not in line as such with the results obtained 
from the analysis as the POH. However, some of the Capital Structure Theories are considered 
important in determining financial leverage of SME’s in Mauritius like agency costs involved, 
information asymmetry problems, liquidity and cash flow problems. The main implication of this 
study is to understand the position of SME in Mauritius in terms of their debt and its importance 
and contribution to the National Income. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines the determinants of debt financing of SMEs in Mauritius. Financing decisions 
have been given considerable attention either within the context of perfect markets (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958) or imperfect markets. In a world of perfect markets, if capital structure decisions are 
conceived, then these should not create problems to entrepreneurs. Since the risk in relation to financing can be 
diversified away. However, imperfections are indispensable to market operations. It is generally argued that these 
may turn out to be particularly acute in the context of small firms. One of the explanations could be the non-
separation of ownership and control and non-existence of a market control mechanism, which magnifies the 
information asymmetry given the weak participation of small firms in capital markets.  
 
The investment theory literature distinguishes between internal and external financing. Yet, it seldom pays 
attention to different instruments of external financing. Zingales (2000) argues that, “empirically, the emphasis on 
large firms has led us to ignore (or study less than necessary) the rest of the universe: the young and small firms, 
who do not have access to public markets”. Generally, SMEs and entrepreneurial activities are considered to be 
important to economic development for a country (Hamilton and Harper, 1994). The few empirical studies on the 
capital structure of SMEs were mainly concentrated on developed economies with varied and inconclusive results.
1
  
 
The differences in institutional arrangements and financial markets between developed and developing 
countries indeed merit the need to look at the problem from the perspective of developing economies, in particular 
within the context of African countries such as Mauritius. The research question is to find out what influences 
                                                 
1 (refer to Chittenden et al., 1996; Cressy and Olofsson, 1997; Jordan et al., 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999; Esperanc¸a et al., 2003; 
Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). 
T 
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SMEs’ debt financing decisions? This is the focus of the current study. SMEs in Mauritius are defined as firms 
which provide work for not more than 100 persons and whose total asset base, excluding land and building does not 
exceed the cedi equivalent of $1 million in value (Venture Capital Trust Fund Act, 2004).  
 
Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) plays an important role in the development of an economic of a country 
(both developing and developed countries). They contribute to social growth through employment generation, 
exports, foreign currency, investment, income, wealth distribution and creation of new business. These benefits lead 
to economic growth and many countries has been promoting the setting up of small and medium business. In 2002 
organization like World Bank Group had approved more than $ 1.5 billion to SME support program as it is believed 
that SME play and contribute to future expansion of an economy. 
 
As part of its policy of democratization of the economy, the Mauritian government has established a fund 
of Rs 200 million to promote the creation, restructuring and consolidation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).Mauritius is well placed to take advantage of these new opportunities.  The SME sector, therefore, has a 
major role to play. Besides, employment in the large establishments have fallen from 61% of total employment in 
2000 to around 56% at present implying that the percentage of total employment in the SME sector is taking an 
upward trend.  It is equally important to note that 21% of the working population is currently working in their own 
or family enterprises.  These point out that the small and medium enterprise sector is rapidly gaining ground. 
 
Consequently, the study shows very appealing results in terms of the capital structure of the Mauritian 
SMEs. As stated by Titman and Wessels (1988), small firms usually tend to use more Short term debt finance than 
their larger counterparts. In the Mauritian context, it can be observed that Short term debt accounts for a higher 
proportion of total debt. This implies that Mauritian SMEs are mostly capable of accessing Short term credit in 
financing their business activities. Small firms are negatively related to Long term debt but positively related to 
Short term debt. This confirms the fact that reputation plays indeed and important role (Diamond, 1989). Older firms 
are not able to attract more debt capital whilst younger firms on the other hand do not have an easy access to Short 
term debt at favorable terms as compared to their listed counterparts. 
 
This paper attempts to add to the existing literature by bringing new evidence on the financing decisions of 
SMEs for the period 2002-2008 for the case of a sample of 25 firms. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides a brief empirical review of the literature of capital structure. Section 3 describes the data, 
methodology and the econometric analysis adopted to explain the determinants of financial leverage of SMEs. In 
section 4, we provide discussion on the results of the panel data estimation. We conclude in section 6. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
 
Several studies have attempted to describe the variation in debt ratios across firms. Some suggested that 
firms would usually select capital structure in relation to the attributes determining the various costs and benefits 
related to debt and equity financing. These findings vary from the irrelevancy hypotheses (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958) to the optimal capital structure. The latter describes a situation whereby the cost of capital is minimized and 
the value of the firm is maximized, hence, maximizing the wealth of shareholders. Yet, these studies focused mainly 
on large listed firms. Small and Medium Enterprises have received limited attention in terms of the theories which 
have been developed to explain financing preferences, thus raising the issue of whether these findings are valid for 
firms other than large listed ones.  
 
The Trade Off Theory (TOT) explains that firms are generally financed by both equities and debts. The 
TOT deals with the two main concepts, namely cost of financial distress and concept of agency costs. As per 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), the attractiveness of debt falls with the personal tax on the interest income. A firm 
would usually face financial distress when the firm is unable to cope with the debt holders' obligations. If the firm 
faces an ongoing failure in making payments to the debt holders, the firm can even be insolvent. The direct cost of 
financial distress refers to the cost of insolvency of a firm. The assets of the firm may be required to be sold at 
distress price once the proceedings of the insolvency starts. This is generally much lower than the current values of 
the assets. A massive amount of administrative and legal costs are also involved in the insolvency. Even if the 
company is not running at a loss, the financial distress of the company may crop up a number of indirect costs like 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March 2011 Volume 10, Number 3 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  115 
cost of employees, cost of customers, cost of suppliers, cost of investors, cost of managers and shareholders. The 
firms may often experience clashes of interests with the management of the firm, debt holders and shareholders. 
These disputes generally raise the issues of agency. These in turn give rise to the agency costs.  
 
The Pecking Order Hypothesis (POH) became one of the most dominant theories of corporate leverage. 
Following the work on Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), Information Asymmetry (Majluf and Myers, 
1984) and Signaling Theory (Ross, 1977), Myers (1984) proposed that firms usually prefer internal to external 
finance. The pecking order hypothesis is normally in line with internal funds. When it is necessary to resort to 
external financing, the least risky claim is best. Hence, debt is preferable to equity finance. While empirical evidence 
on the POH does not offer convincing support (see Klein et al., 2002, and Barclay and Smith, 2005 for a summary 
and discussion, respectively) its simplicity, predicting the priorities with which firms choose their means of 
financing, has given it a wide appeal. 
 
Some researchers (e.g. Berggren et al., 2000; Chittenden et al., 1996; Holmes and Kent, 1991; Howorth, 
2001; Norton, 1991a, 1991b; Scherr et al., 1993) have tried to establish whether the POH applies to small firms. In 
general, empirical evidence about the applicability of the POH to small firms is mixed. For example, Norton (1991a) 
studied of the POH in high growth companies whereas Chittenden et al. (1996) observed that small firms especially 
seem to develop structures that have a minimum, rather than a maximum, amount of debt. 
 
Furthermore Howorth (2001) found evidence of owners refusing to contemplate external equity finance. 
The confusing picture of the financial preferences of small firms may stem from the wide variety of ventures 
studied. These range widely both within and between studies thus rendering comparison difficult. They used a 
sample that includes firms that range in size from 60 to three employees; According to Chittenden et al. (1996) 
small firms are considered as employing up to 100 staff while Holmes and Kent (1991) use a cut-off of 20 
employees.  
 
Moreover, as Ang (1992) claims that there may be confusion in relation to the use of the terms equity and 
debt due to the financial intertwining of owners and their businesses that is characteristic of many small firms. 
Berger and Udell (1998) studied that in small firms much external debt is not external in an economic sense. Usually 
many lenders to small businesses require personal guarantees. From the perspective of the entrepreneur, it can be 
argued that the debt is more appropriately considered a personal liability. This confusion adds to the difficulty of 
assessing the applicability of the POH to small firm financing. 
 
The issue of information asymmetry, which underpins the POH, is particularly severe in new ventures. 
Thus at this stage of their development, businesses are informationally opaque (Hall et al., 2000; Schmid, 2001) and 
assets are often intangible and knowledge-based. Many of the methods in which owners of established businesses 
facilitate more efficient transactions by signaling information about the quality of their goods through, for example, 
an established track record and product branding are often not available to business start-ups. Further, firms prefer 
debt to equity finance where external funds are required. However, in attempting to raise external capital, investors 
facing an adverse selection problem would normally demand a premium, hence raising the required rate of return on 
external capital. This is the consequence of Information Asymmetry between managers and investors. Firms are thus 
better off if they meet financing needs from internal funds.  
 
The presence of asymmetric information between managers and investors can cause the financial assets 
issued by the firms to be undervalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This in turn raises the cost of external financing as 
compared to internal, hence, making the second one preferable as a financing means. At the same time, the 
transaction costs derived from the external financing are avoided. The capital structure is thus the result of a 
“hierarchical” financing of firms throughout the years. 
 
Contradictions of the POH 
 
It must be emphasized that the relation between debt and economic profitability stated by the “Pecking 
Order” is contrary to the Trade off Theory and also to the usefulness of leverage as a financial signal (Ross, 1977). 
In addition, it further contradicts the mechanism to reduce the agency conflicts (Jensen, 1986). In all these situations, 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March 2011 Volume 10, Number 3 
116 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
the best financial situation and opportunities, one can relate to higher economic profitability predicts a direct relation 
between debt and profitability. The negative valuation of equity issue announcements by the financial markets 
(Myers, 1984) is also in accordance with the “Pecking Order” Theory. But it contradicts the existence of a search for 
an optimal debt ratio by the firms. This would mean that any change at the level of debt, be it a rise or fall, should 
normally cause an increase in value, since those changes in the capital structure would follow the optimal ratio, 
which is, the one that maximizes a firm’s value. 
 
The advantage of leveraged firms 
 
Managers of highly leveraged firms with less cash flow in hand, perceive their ability of using the firm’s 
resources for futile purposes, and follow a dramatically falling trend. Thus, firms which are mainly financed by debt 
offer managers lesser decision power as opposed to those financed mostly by equity. Hence, debt can be used as a 
control mechanism which enables lenders and shareholders to become the Principal parties in the corporate 
governance structure. Managers failing to meet their debt obligations can be removed and replaced by those that can 
do better. Therefore since leveraged firms ensure shareholders those managers do not have the ability to waste the 
company’s resources in discretionary expenses; they can be viewed as a better means to eradicate such problems for 
them. The ultimate outcome of creating debt is thus to transfer wealth from managers to investors (Jensen, 1989). 
 
The above reasoning may conclude that firms opting for debt financing are always better for investors than 
those which use equity financing. Yet the question arises as to why not all the firms prefer debt financing. The 
answer lays in the fact that in general, firms using debt financing have to bear the increasing cost of capital and other 
related costs. As such, highly leveraged firms are more likely to face cash problems. This in turn raises their 
likelihood of bankruptcy, thus increasing all the costs in relation to bankruptcy. Highly leveraged firms tend to be 
low rated since they are generally regarded as risky companies. Hence this classification raises their overall cost of 
capital as they must guarantee higher returns for them to attract investors than those guaranteed by well rated firms. 
 
Developing versus Developed 
 
In general, SMEs and entrepreneurial activities are regarded as necessary for economic development 
according to Hamilton and Harper, (1994). The few empirical studies on the capital structure of SMEs have focused 
mainly on developed economies. It ended with varied and inconclusive results (Chittenden et al., 1996; Cressy and 
Olofsson, 1997; Jordan et a., 1998, Michaelas et al, 1999; Esperanc¸a et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira 
2005). As such, a developing economy would normally be different from a developed one, in terms of economic 
conditions and government policies. These differences in institutional arrangements and financial markets between 
developed and developing countries express the need to look at the issue from the perspective of developing 
economies, especially amongst African Countries. Mauritius form part of African countries and SMEs in Mauritius 
may show a different capital structure with limited access to external finance.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The sample of firms used in this study was drawn from Enterprise Mauritius since they represent the lists of 
all registered SMEs in Mauritius. Twenty five SMEs have been included for which the financial statements have 
been examined for the period 2004-2008. The sample excludes financial companies. This is because financial 
institutions tend to be regulated differently in terms of their capital adequacy requirements. Firms that have been 
chosen to be included in this study needs to have the following prerequisites that is it must have filed accounts for 
the period of the study; Do not have inconsistent financial data for more than four accounting periods. Accordingly a 
number of firms were discarded for which data was not available for the whole period, either because they were 
newly formed or having missing values for more than four years.  Since all the firms sampled have the same 
financial year, this eliminates the distorting impact of different reporting periods and seasonality patterns.  
 
Econometric Analysis 
 
A panel data regression model is employed. The general form of the model can be written as: 
ititit XY   with the subscript “i” denote the cross-sectional dimension, “t” representing the time-
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series dimension. The left-hand variable “ itY ” represents the dependent variable (the firm’s debt ratio.) X it set of 
explanatory variables in the estimation model, Alpha is the constant, Beta represents the coefficients, it is a random 
term, it = i + itv where i  is the firm specific effects and itv  is the random term.  
 
The regression model employed for this study is in line with what was used by Cassar and Holmes (2003), 
and Hall et al (2004). This takes the following form: 
 
 ititititititit RISKGROWPROFASTSIZEAGELDR 6543210  it  
 
 ititititititit RISKGROWPROFASTSIZEAGESDR 6543210  it , 
 
Leverage, which is the dependent variable, is defined in terms of debt ratio. Debt contains both long-term 
and short-term debts. Consequently measures of capital structure include; long-term debt ratio that is long-term bank 
loans and other long-term liabilities repayable beyond one year, such as directors’ loans, hire purchase and leasing 
obligations and short-term debt ratio which includes bank overdraft, bank loans payable within a year and other 
current liabilities. The two dependent variables are: LDR = long-term debt/ (total equity + total debt) SDR = Short-
term debt/ (total equity + total debt).The independent variables include, age of the firm (AGE), Size of the firm 
(SIZE), Asset structure (AST), Growth (GROW), profitability (PROF) and firm risk (RISK). These definitions 
follow those of previous studies (see Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Esperanc¸a et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-
Mira, 2005). All the variables used in this study are based on book value in line with the argument by Myers (1984) 
that book values are proxies for the value of assets in place.  
 
Variables 
 
Age of the firm (Age): Age of the firm is normally viewed as a standard measure of reputation in capital structure 
models. Over time, from the lifecycle perspective, the firm establishes itself as a continuing business and thus 
increasing its capacity to take more debt. But a bank would tend to evaluate the credit worthiness of entrepreneurs 
before granting a loan since these are commonly believed to raise high hopes on very risky projects promising high 
profitability rates. According to Diamond (1989), firm reputation can be used to overcome the issue of 
creditworthiness. He suggested that reputation is the good name a firm has built up over the years, which is 
understood by the market and which has observed its ability to meet its obligations in a timely manner. 
 
Firm size (Size): Size has been considered as an important determinant of a firm’s capital structure. Larger firms 
tend to be more diversified and thus have lower variance of earnings, which allow them to stand high leverage ratios 
(Castanias, 1983; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999). Smaller firms on the other hand may find it somewhat 
more costly to work through information asymmetries with lenders. As such it may present lower debt ratios 
(Castanias, 1983). Empirical evidence on the relationship between size and capital structure of SMEs sustains a 
positive relationship (Barton et al, 1989; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). They claim that smaller firms are more likely to 
depend on equity while larger firms are most preferably use debt. Cassar and Holmes (2003), Esperanca et al. (2003) 
and Hall et al. (2004) observed a positive link between firm size and long-term debt but a negative association with 
short-term debt. According to Titman and Wessels (1988), small firms have a tendency to use more short-term 
finance than their larger counterparts because smaller firms normally have higher transactions costs when they issue 
long-term debt or equity. 
 
Asset structure (AS): Asset structure is equally an essential determinant of SMEs capital structure. Firms with more 
tangible assets would normally exhibit greater liquidation value (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Titman and Wessels, 
1988). Such firms have higher financial leverage. This is because they borrow at lower interest rates and their debt is 
secured with the assets (Bradley et al., 1984). Debt could be more readily used if there are durable assets to provide 
for collateral (Wedig et al., 1988). The costs in relation to adverse selection and moral hazards are minimized 
provided the firm’s assets are used as collateral. The limitation of maturity length of credit granted by lenders may 
explain partially debt structure in SMEs. In this sense, small firms can use less long-term debt, but possibly more 
short-term debt, than large firms (Sogorb-Mira, 2005). The empirical evidence provides confirmation of a positive 
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relationship between asset structure and long-term debt, and a negative relationship with short-term debt (Chittenden 
et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 
2005). Yet, Esperanca et al. (2003) found positive relationship between asset structure and long-term as well as 
short-term debt. 
 
Profitability (Prof): Profitability is normally assumed to have a positive link with debt. This has been clarified by 
the POH, whereby firms prefer internal sources of finance to external sources. Profitable firms, having access to 
retained profits, may rely on it as opposed to outside sources such as debt (Barton et al., 1989; Titman and Wessels, 
1988). The POH can readily be applied to SMEs (Cosh and Hughes, 1994). In fact SMEs seem to face a more acute 
version of the POH. It is called as a “constrained” POH by Holmes and Kent (1991) and a “modified” POH by Ang 
(1991) since they have less access to external funds, debt and equity than do large enterprises. The POH advances 
that the use of external funds is very much connected to profitability. SMEs, in particular if they are not listed, will 
usually make use of internally generated funds as a first resort. Cressy and Olofsson (1997) encountered that SMEs 
show evidence of control aversion. This is demonstrated by a preference to sell the firm rather than relinquishing 
equity. It is also described by the fact that owners prefer to use internally generated funds to finance further 
investment. If they are not able to do this, they would pursue debt financing. Empirical evidence seems to be 
consistent with the POH (Barton et al. 1989; Chittenden et al., 1996; Friend and Lang, 1988; Jordan et al., 1998; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Moreover, Cassar and Holmes (2003), Esperanc¸a et al. 
(2003), Hall et al. (2004) and Sogorb-Mira (2005) suggested a negative effect of profitability on both long-term and 
short-term debt. 
 
Firm growth (sg): Michaelas et al. (1999) claimed that future prospects have a positive association with debt, 
especially short-term debt. They further argue that the agency problem and the resulting cost of financing may fall if 
the firm issues short term rather than long-term debt. Growth is expected to place higher demand on internally 
generated funds. This in turn pushes the firm into borrowing (Hall et al., 2004). Myers (1977) nevertheless, is of the 
view that firms with growth prospects will have a smaller proportion of debt in their capital structure. This is due to 
the fact that conflicts between debt and equity holders are in particular serious for assets that give the firm the option 
to carry out such growth opportunities in the future. In the situation of small firms with more concentrated 
ownership, it has been noted that high growth firms will require more external financing and therefore would display 
higher leverage Heshmati, (2001). There exists also an association between the degree of previous growth and future 
growth. Yet empirical evidence seems inconclusive. Michaelas et al. (1999) recognized that future growth has a 
positive relation with leverage and long-term debt. In a South African study, Abor and Biekpe (2006) demonstrated 
that SMEs with high growth potentials tend to attract more debt finance than those with low growth opportunities. 
Cassar and Holmes (2003), Hall et al. (2004) and Sogorb-Mira (2005) also showed positive relationship between 
growth and both long-term and short-term debt. Whilst Chittenden et al. (1996), Jordan et al. (1998) and Esperanca 
et al., 2003 reported mixed evidence. 
 
Firm risk (Risk): According to Kim and Sorensen (1986), firms with high degree of business risk have usually less 
capacity to sustain financial risks. Hence they use less debt. The level of risk is normally considered to be one of the 
primary determinants of a firm’s capital structure (Kale et al., 1991). Yet empirical investigation has led to 
contradictory results. Some studies have experienced an inverse relationship between risk and debt ratio (Bradley et 
al., 1984; Friend and Lang, 1988; Kale et al., 1991; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Others denote a positive association 
(Jordan et al., 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999). Esperanc¸a et al. (2003) also observed positive associations between 
firm risk and both long-term and short-term leverage. 
 
Based on the above interpretation and assertions, the following hypotheses have been formulated. 
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Table 1: Formulation of Hypotheses 
Age   H1a  Age of the firm is negatively related to long-term debt ratio. 
H2a  Age of the firm is positively related to short-term debt ratio. 
Size  H1b:  Firm size should be positively related to long-term debt ratio. 
H2b:  Firm size should be negatively related to short-term debt ratio. 
Asset  H1c:  Asset structure is positively related to long-term debt ratio. 
H2c:  Asset structure is negatively related to short term debt ratio. 
Profit  H1d Profitability is negatively related to long-term debt ratio. 
H2d Profitability is negatively related to short-term debt ratio. 
Growth  H1e Growth is positively associated with long-term debt ratio. 
H2e Growth is negatively associated with short-term debt ratio. 
Risk  H1f Risk is negatively related to long-term debt ratio. 
H2f Risk is negatively related to short-term debt ratio. 
 
 
4. RESULTS: Long Term Debt 
 
According to Table 2, the descriptive statistics are displayed with respect to both dependent and 
independent variables. Most of the SMEs have a relatively low debt ratio, as shown by the mean total debt ratio of 
43 percent (29 percent (SDR) + 14 percent (LDR)). The mean for Long term debt of the sample firms is 14 percent 
and 29 percent for Short term debt of total equities and liabilities. This highlights the importance of Short term debt 
over Long term debt in financing Mauritian SMEs. Normally, Long term debt is difficult to obtain from lending 
institutions because of collateral. As such, Short term debts are more often used by SMEs. This is consistent with 
empirical evidence. The average age is approximately 10 years and varies between 8 to 15 years. The mean size of 
SMEs is around 3 million and 500 thousand rupees (inverse of log: 10
x 
times 6.54). Asset structure has a mean of 
0.33. This implies that on average, fixed asset accounts for 33 percent of total assets, which indeed proves a point. 
Thus small firms do not really have many assets to use as collateral when having recourse to long term debt. As far 
as profitability is concerned, the mean profitability over the period amounts to -0.5 percent which follows a 
decreasing trend. As for the average growth rate, it accounts for 8.5 percent whilst firm risk shows a mean value of 
0.19. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
LDR 0.140188 0.162772 0.001707 0.565419 
SDR 0.292399 0.138512 0.017842 0.633483 
Sg 0.846266 2.149586 0.002532 10.71425 
Prof -0.005501 0.300961 -1.630958 0.815306 
As 0.328624 0.291096 0.003124 1.397705 
Size 6.540699 0.672255 5.091512 8.483709 
Age 9.72 1.975831 8 15 
Risk 0.190466 0.155759 0.031719 0.62702 
 
 
In order to examine the possible degree of multicollinearity amongst the variables, a correlation matrix has 
been computed in Table 3. It can be noted that Long term debt has a positive correlation with asset structure, sales 
growth and size whilst Short term debt exhibits a positive association with age and size only. Normally 
multicollinearity would have been detected if the correlation matrix would have displayed a correlation of greater 
than 80% (0.8). 
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Table 3: Correlation among independent variables 
Variable Ldr Sdr Age Size As Prof Sg Risk 
Ldr 1        
Sdr -0.657 1       
Age -0.197 0.2473 1      
Size 0.0034 0.0975 0.0631 1     
As 0.3437 -0.507 -0.073 -0.1437 1    
Prof -0.108 -0.048 0.1411 0.1395 0.0229 1   
Sg 0.4533 -0.429 -0.081 -0.2042 0.4848 -0.2077 1  
Risk -0.254 -0.065 -0.126 0.0455 0.0875 -0.0156 -0.12 1 
 
 
Table 4 and 5 shows the econometrics results for the whole sample. In order to identify which methodology 
is appropriate, we compared the pooled estimates and random effect estimate, the Lagrangian Multiplier Test is 
performed. With a large chi-square test, indicative of a low p-value, we reject the null that the pooled estimate is 
appropriate. Second, to compare the random effect estimates with the fixed effect estimates, the Hausman test is 
performed. If the model is correctly specified and if the individual effects are uncorrelated with the independent 
variables, the fixed effect and random effect should not be different.  
 
 
Table 4: Hausman specification Test 
Variables (b)  Fixed (B)   Random (b-B) difference sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) S.E 
 Coefficients   
Age -0.0157276 -0.0157391 0.0000115 0.0009754 
Size 0.0325446 0.0313983 0.0011463 0.0042716 
As 0.1227165 0.1221692 0.0005473 0.0130223 
Prof -0.0226923 -0.0226093 -0.000083 0.012047 
Sg 0.0243599 0.0240613 0.0002986 0.0013699 
Risk -0.2777874 -0.2779829 0.0001955 0.0121639 
 
 
A high chi-square value is indicative of the appropriateness of either the fixed effect or the random effect. 
With a large chi-squared, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the random group effect model. The Hausman test 
produces a chi-square of 0.9999. Hence, the random effect model is the appropriate model to use, as Prob > chi2 is 
indeed greater than 0.05.Table 5 shows the results after correcting for Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity and 
detects no autocorrelation. Profitability is insignificant at 5 percent level.  
 
According to Table 5, Age has a negative relationship with Long Term debt, which is indeed in conformity 
to the Hypothesis. Yet the negative relationship could imply that older firms do not have good track records in terms 
of financial worthiness. As such, they might not be in a position to take a long term loan. They are not able to access 
debt financing more easily than listed firms who do have a proper credit history. The positive association between 
size and Long term debt confirms the hypothesis mention above. It also shows a significant result implying that as 
the firm keeps on expanding, in terms of assets and diversification, it is going to have a rather easier access to Long 
term debt. Smaller firms find it quite difficult to have access to long term debt since it is more costly as a result of 
information asymmetry with lenders and owner managers.  
 
 
Table 5: Test for Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity 
Ldr Coefficient Standard Error T P>/t/ 95% Confidence Interval 
Age -.0159539 .0050307 - 3.17 0.002 -.025814 -.0060939 
Size .0286484 .014871 1.93 0.054 -.0004982 .0577951 
As .1371579 .0404505 3.39 0.001 .0578765 .2164393 
Prof -.0231291 .0343387 -0.67 .501 -.0904317 .0441735 
Sg .0218508 .0055444 3.94 0.000 .010984 .0327175 
Risk -.2856854 .0640105 -4.46 0.000 -.4111436 -.1602272 
Cons .098145 .1107642 0.89 0.376 -.1189489 .3152389 
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The results for asset structure shows that it is statistically significant at 10 percent for Long Term debts. 
They also denote a positive relationship. The reasons could be that small firms are perceived to be risky ventures 
and as such, they are often required to provide more valuable collateral when applying for Long term debt financing. 
Since asset substitution effect is stronger within small firms, the owner has greater discretion leading to higher 
monitoring costs by banks and other suppliers of Long term debt financing. This leads these institutions to require 
more valuable collateral that just a mere financial statement. The result shows an insignificant relationship thus 
rejecting the hypothesis. Had it been otherwise, the Pecking Order hypothesis would have been confirmed meaning 
that less profitable SMEs would more likely have recourse to Long term debt. Unfortunately the p-value shows a 
different result. It says that whether there is an increase in profit or a decrease, there would be no effect on debt 
financing. Small firms do not consider profitability as a factor when deciding upon Long term debt. This could be 
due to various reasons. 
 
First it could be that small firms in general tend to focus more on their asset structure or their growth when 
they need to take a long term loan. As banks normally demand solid collateral before granting a loan and they also 
prefer stable growth as opposed to high profitability when granting loan. Therefore small firms would rather 
concentrate in increasing their turnover, fixed assets and total assets rather than paying attention to whether they are 
making profit or loss. A second reason could be the ambiguous trend of profitability. The data collected showed an 
awkward trend, in the sense that some firms were running at losses for several years whilst others made profit for 
two to three years then delved in losses the year after and the year coming, they started to prosper again. Others start 
with profit but ended in losses. As such much firms presented this kind of profitability. But most of the firms face 
considerable amount of losses for several years. This could also explain the insignificant result generated by the 
software. 
 
Growth has a positive association with debt. As theory predicted as well as empirical findings, in the case 
of small firms, high growth firms are expected to be having easy access to Long term debt since, as it has been 
specified, banks would normally prefer stable growth rather than high returns, which is why these firms generally 
tend to prefer stable growth. Risk is negatively related to long term debt, implying that firms taking higher risks 
have normally less capacity to sustain this level of financial risk. They therefore use less debt. It thus confirms the 
hypothesis as the p value is indeed significant. 
 
Results for Short Term Debt 
 
 
Table 6: Hausman specification Test 
Sdr (b)  Fixed (B)   Random (b-B) difference sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) S.E 
 Coefficients   
Age .0150293 .0148612 .000168 .0008051 
Size -.0026246 -.0005222 -.0021023 .0035444 
As -.1597598 -.1679245 .0081647 .0108172 
Prof -.0641703 -.0583214 -.0058489 .0100113 
Sg -.0183236 -.0175343 -.0007893 .0011351 
Risk -.0392576 -.0371209 -.0021367 .0100347 
 
 
With a large chi-squared, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the random group effect model. The 
Hausman test produces a chi-square of 0.9942. Hence, the random effect model is the appropriate model to use, as 
Prob > chi2 is indeed greater than 0.05. The next step involves a test for Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity and 
as shown in Table 7, it corrects for both and detects no autocorrelation. 
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Table 7: Test for Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity 
Sdr Coefficient Standard Error T P>/t/ 95% Confidence Interval 
Age .0157046 .0041385 3.79 0.000 .0075933 .0238159 
Size -.0000807 .0121848 -0.01 0.995 -.0239624 .0238011 
As -.1859595 .0335309 -5.55 0.000 -.2516789 -.1202402 
Prof -.0713983 .0276539 -2.58 0.010 -.125599 -.0171976 
Sg -.0154464 .0045792 -3.37 0.001 -.0244215 -.0064714 
Risk -.0100562 .0525825 -0.19 0.848 -.1131161 .0930037 
Cons .218349 .0909636 2.40 0.016 .0400635 .3966344 
 
 
Age of the firm denotes a positive relationship in relation to Short term debt. This implies that younger 
firms are not often being offered credit facilities so easily. It could be because they are new and do not have enough 
knowledge about the market. Creditors thus find it riskier. Whereas older firms have experience and knowledge and 
creditors would more likely prefer to grant credit facilities to them rather than trusting a new firm. Size of the firm 
observes a negative relationship with short term debt but the p value is insignificant. This implies that when taking 
short term debt, size does not have an important role to play. Banks would not refrain from granting a small amount 
of loan to firms simply because they are small in size. Other factors will need to be considered. 
 
The asset structure which is indeed a very important determinant in debt financing, as banks usually looks 
for collateral before granting any facility. As such, asset structure has a negative association with Short term debt. 
This means small firms tend to rely on short term debt for financing since the necessity to provide collateral is not as 
important as in the case of Long term debt. Surprisingly profitability denoted a significant p value. The significantly 
negative relation obtained between profitability and Short term debt confirms the hypothesis that less profitable 
SMEs are more likely to require Short term debt financing than more profitable ones. Hence, this observation is 
consistent with the Pecking Order arguments. This maybe because small firms have easier access to short term debt 
and thus loss-making firms would normally tend to rely more on credit facilities and also short term loans for 
financing new investments. 
 
Sales growth denotes a negative relationship with Short term debt and is statistically significant. This 
implies that as firms continue to take more short term debt, they would gradually start to experience a fall in their 
growth. This is due to the fact that an increase in number of creditors might prove to be bad for the reputation of the 
firm since too much credit facilities can lead to a fall in growth. Furthermore, since small firms find it easier to 
borrow money on a short term basis, they would tend to borrow as much as they can. Yet this can lead to fall in the 
level of growth as the cost of borrowing might turn higher. Risk denotes a negative relationship with short term debt 
but then it is also accompanied by an insignificant p-value. It can thus be concluded that risk factors are not 
considered as an important determinant when taking short term loans. Banks furthermore, are rather more concerned 
when granting long term loan. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
This study examined the determinants of financial leverage of SMEs in Mauritius. The results describes 
that short-term debt constitutes a relatively high proportion of total debt of Mauritian SMEs. Furthermore, the 
positive associations between the debt ratios and both Asset Structure and Growth are very crucial in influencing 
SMEs’ access to debt finance. Normally, when applying for external debt finance, newer and smaller firms are often 
discriminated against. The positive association between asset structure and long-term debt ratio implies that asset 
tangibility or collateral plays an important role in SMEs’ access to long-term debt finance. Moreover, SMEs with 
lower portions of fixed assets in their total assets are likely to face difficulty in having access to long-term debt 
capital because of their inability to produce the required collateral. Hence, the ability to provide collateral still 
remains an important factor for SMEs in accessing long-term credit in Mauritius. Yet, the negative relationship 
observed between asset structure and short-term debt ratio means that SMEs in Mauritius try to finance their fixed 
assets with long-term, and their current assets with short-term debt. Therefore, it supports the asset maturity 
matching principle in SMEs. 
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The results clearly does not support the POH in the sense that SMEs profitability is negatively related to 
Long term debt due to the irrational trend of profitability. As such, it supports the fact that due to the financial 
intertwining of owners and their businesses, there may be confusion in relation to the use of the terms equity and 
debt, which is characteristic of many small firms (Ang, 1992). On the other hand for Short term debt, it proves the 
point. This is because SMEs would have a preference for inside financing over outside debt financing, as the cost of 
outside financing is greater for the firm. Since Mauritian SMEs do not have access to the public equity, the 
theoretical predictions that seem to explain their capital structure is the “constrained” POH by Holmes and Kent 
(1991) and a “modified” POH by Ang (1991). This means SMEs will initially rely on retained earnings, if they are 
unable to do this, they will seek debt financing.  
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